1. What was the situation for the Soviet Military before Gorbachev became Premier?
The Soviet military had always represented a very powerful force in the Soviet society before Gorbachev became Premier. It played a large role in maintaining Soviet security as well as claiming the scarce resources, having access to raw materials and advanced technology. Particularly, under the Brezhnev period, the power of the military had increased and the presence of the military was institutionalized in 1973, which gave it prominence as the highest decision making body. However, in the late 1970s, Brezhnev’s relations with the military deteriorated and the rate of Soviet economic growth declined. As a result defense spending decreased, and the military needed to meet the increased threat posed by the American military buildup. Consequently, much attention went to building up the nation’s military at the expense of development within the Soviet Union, which weakened the economy. The Brezhnev leadership included an acceptance of the military’s monopoly of expertise in the military affairs. Also, the Party sought to enhance the honor of the military profession, promoting a program of military education. During the Brezhnev years militarism was characteristic of high military power, heavy reliance on military equipment of foreign policy and secrecy. Although Soviet military power grew rapidly in the 1970s, the economic and technological aspect of that power diminished in the late 1970s.
Document 1:
Gorbachev’s current relations with the Soviet military must be seen against the background of developments in the late Brezhnev period. Under Brezhnev the influence and power of the military had significantly increased; indeed, the early Brezhnev years have aptly been termed the "golden age" of the high command. During this period (until about 1975) the concerns of the armed forces were given precedence and requests for resources were rarely challenged. The presence of the military was also institutionalized in the Politburo in 1973 (with the promotion of Marshal Andrei Grechko to that body), giving it a direct voice in the highest decision-making body.
2. How did the Soviet military interpret the application of those policies to it?
The Main Personnel Directorate and the Main Inspectorate appeared to be the key institutions through which Gorbachev sought to conduct the process of perestroika in the armed forces. Initially, the military interpreted the application of the policy of perestroika as something that applied to the rest of society, not including them. However, at the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, Gorbachev made it clear that the process included the military too. Its main emphasis was on increasing discipline and raising troop morale as well as admitting to previous shortcomings. Under Gorbachev’s rule, arms control received more attention than it did in the past. More specifically, arms control was seen as a major instrument for enhancing Soviet security and reducing the economic burden of the arms race. The Soviet military generally supported this arms control policy, however they did raise a few concerns. Military concerns included ranges of issues such as nepotism and protectionism in the military, housing and military-patriotic education. Additionally, there were questions about the arrangement of the nearly 100,000 officers that would be demobilized due to Gorbachev’s reforms and the increasing number of officers seeking discharge.
Document 2:
Now, however, things have changed. The military has come in for widespread criticism. Some of this comes from soldier and officers who are concerned about conditions in the armed forces; some comes from civilians who are critical not only of social relations in the military, but also of the relationship between the military and society. The armed forces now look less like an exemplary institution than they did in the 1970s. Trotsky was perhaps right when he wrote that, “the army is a copy of society and suffers form all its ills, usually at a higher temperature.”
3. How did the Soviet state apply those policies to the military, and what were the effects?
The Rust affair occurred in 1987 and involved a German aviator illegally landing in Moscow. This incident led to a stiff rebuke of the military, which was essentially criticized for a “dereliction of duty.” This led to important personnel changes, including the retirement of several military officials. This incident in effect aided Gorbachev in the implementation of his reforms by removing numerous military officials opposed to him. Under his rule, the military’s influence on arms control and security policy also decreased. Although it continued to remain an important player, it did not dominate the policy process as it once did under the rule of Brezhnev. Gorbachev initially did not have strong ties with the military when he first came to power and he had little background in defense and military. He attempted to reduce the strain the Army place on economic demands and his government slowly reduced the size of the army. As a result, the Soviet forces left Afghanistan and left their Warsaw Pact neighbors alone. Ultimately, because of these reforms the Eastern Bloc collapse by the end of 1990 and the Soviet citizens began to turn against the Communist government. Consequently, the military tried to contain conflicts and demonstrations, however they weren’t very effective. The Soviet system was crumbling in the process. Additionally, Gorbachev saw that large amounts of money were being poured into the military to keep up with the US. Wanting to free this money, Gorbachev consequently tried to make amends with the West and met with President Reagan to make nuclear disarmament agreements. This ultimately signaled the end of the Cold War.
Document 3:
Gorbachev’s arms control policy should be seen against the background of these changes in doctrine, as well as changes in force posture to make forces more survivable by (1) putting more emphasis on bombers and cruise missiles, and (2) reducing reliance on large heavy missiles in favor of mobile missiles. Viewed in this light, Gorbachev’s willingness to sign the INF treaty makes eminent political and strategic sense. It eliminates an important nuclear threat to the U.S.S.R. posed by the cruise missiles and Pershing 2s, making Soviet territory once again a "sanctuary" from missiles launched from European soil. It also reduces NATO’s capability for nuclear escalation—the main Soviet concern should war in Europe break out—and erodes the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. Furthermore, Soviet advantages in conventional manpower and equipment, not to mention the geographic advantages for rapid conventional reinforcement, remain unaffected. While the U.S.S.R. must dismantle some 400 SS-20s and SS-5s, the targets covered by these weapons can be covered by other strategic systems, particularly the new SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are more accurate and mobile, and hence more survivable. Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons the Soviet military was willing to go along with the deal. At the same time, recent Soviet statements, including those by the military, have increasingly stressed the "defensive nature" of Soviet military doctrine. The main task of the Soviet armed forces is now said to be the "prevention of war." To accomplish this task the Soviet forces will be kept at a level of "reasonable sufficiency," which is defined as a level which "rules out superiority by the forces of imperialism."
4. What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to the military?
Gorbachev was able to successfully link his military reform to the restructuring of the economy. Additionally, he was able to improve relations with the United States the overall West. He was also essentially able to control military expenditures and political decisions regarding the military. Moreover, he significantly escaped from arms racing, to dealing with the threatening international situations by political rather than by military means. Gorbachev essentially put forward a new way of thinking as the foundation for the new Soviet military policies. Gorbachev’s reductions and restructuring degraded the ability of the Soviet military forces to concentrate combat power. Moreover, their offense largely decreased, and instead more focus was put towards their defense. Following Gorbachev’s resignation as President, the Soviet Union ultimately dissolved. Additionally, several Warsaw Pact nations and Soviet republics were inspired by glasnost and declared their intentions to free themselves from Communist rule. Specifically, large republics such as Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania had declared their independence.
Document 4:
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms followed two paths: perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost' (openness). In order to reform the Soviet economy, Gorbachev believed it was necessary to cut spending on the Soviet military, both inside Soviet borders and throughout Eastern Europe. By the end of 1989, 500,000 men had been decommissioned from the Soviet army, greatly reducing its military presence throughout Eastern Europe. In this intelligence assessment from 1990, the real impact of Soviet disarmament for the U.S. and its NATO allies is evaluated. Though some fears remain about Soviet military power, the Soviet unilateral disarmament had fundamentally degraded its military strength, which created new opportunities for the U.S. and NATO in planning for the future of Eastern Europe.
National Intelligence Council. "The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact Soviet Union." Documents and Papers. Cold War International History Project, Apr. 1990. Web. 27 Feb. 2014. <http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/190>.
Soviet Society in the 1980s- The Soviet Military
1. What was the situation for the Soviet Military before Gorbachev became Premier?
The Soviet military had always represented a very powerful force in the Soviet society before Gorbachev became Premier. It played a large role in maintaining Soviet security as well as claiming the scarce resources, having access to raw materials and advanced technology. Particularly, under the Brezhnev period, the power of the military had increased and the presence of the military was institutionalized in 1973, which gave it prominence as the highest decision making body. However, in the late 1970s, Brezhnev’s relations with the military deteriorated and the rate of Soviet economic growth declined. As a result defense spending decreased, and the military needed to meet the increased threat posed by the American military buildup. Consequently, much attention went to building up the nation’s military at the expense of development within the Soviet Union, which weakened the economy.
The Brezhnev leadership included an acceptance of the military’s monopoly of expertise in the military affairs. Also, the Party sought to enhance the honor of the military profession, promoting a program of military education. During the Brezhnev years militarism was characteristic of high military power, heavy reliance on military equipment of foreign policy and secrecy. Although Soviet military power grew rapidly in the 1970s, the economic and technological aspect of that power diminished in the late 1970s.
Document 1:
Gorbachev’s current relations with the Soviet military must be seen against the background of developments in the late Brezhnev period. Under Brezhnev the influence and power of the military had significantly increased; indeed, the early Brezhnev years have aptly been termed the "golden age" of the high command. During this period (until about 1975) the concerns of the armed forces were given precedence and requests for resources were rarely challenged. The presence of the military was also institutionalized in the Politburo in 1973 (with the promotion of Marshal Andrei Grechko to that body), giving it a direct voice in the highest decision-making body.
2. How did the Soviet military interpret the application of those policies to it?
The Main Personnel Directorate and the Main Inspectorate appeared to be the key institutions through which Gorbachev sought to conduct the process of perestroika in the armed forces. Initially, the military interpreted the application of the policy of perestroika as something that applied to the rest of society, not including them. However, at the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, Gorbachev made it clear that the process included the military too. Its main emphasis was on increasing discipline and raising troop morale as well as admitting to previous shortcomings. Under Gorbachev’s rule, arms control received more attention than it did in the past. More specifically, arms control was seen as a major instrument for enhancing Soviet security and reducing the economic burden of the arms race. The Soviet military generally supported this arms control policy, however they did raise a few concerns.
Military concerns included ranges of issues such as nepotism and protectionism in the military, housing and military-patriotic education. Additionally, there were questions about the arrangement of the nearly 100,000 officers that would be demobilized due to Gorbachev’s reforms and the increasing number of officers seeking discharge.
Document 2:
Now, however, things have changed. The military has come in for widespread criticism. Some of this comes from soldier and officers who are concerned about conditions in the armed forces; some comes from civilians who are critical not only of social relations in the military, but also of the relationship between the military and society. The armed forces now look less like an exemplary institution than they did in the 1970s. Trotsky was perhaps right when he wrote that, “the army is a copy of society and suffers form all its ills, usually at a higher temperature.”
3. How did the Soviet state apply those policies to the military, and what were the effects?
The Rust affair occurred in 1987 and involved a German aviator illegally landing in Moscow. This incident led to a stiff rebuke of the military, which was essentially criticized for a “dereliction of duty.” This led to important personnel changes, including the retirement of several military officials. This incident in effect aided Gorbachev in the implementation of his reforms by removing numerous military officials opposed to him. Under his rule, the military’s influence on arms control and security policy also decreased. Although it continued to remain an important player, it did not dominate the policy process as it once did under the rule of Brezhnev.
Gorbachev initially did not have strong ties with the military when he first came to power and he had little background in defense and military. He attempted to reduce the strain the Army place on economic demands and his government slowly reduced the size of the army. As a result, the Soviet forces left Afghanistan and left their Warsaw Pact neighbors alone. Ultimately, because of these reforms the Eastern Bloc collapse by the end of 1990 and the Soviet citizens began to turn against the Communist government. Consequently, the military tried to contain conflicts and demonstrations, however they weren’t very effective. The Soviet system was crumbling in the process. Additionally, Gorbachev saw that large amounts of money were being poured into the military to keep up with the US. Wanting to free this money, Gorbachev consequently tried to make amends with the West and met with President Reagan to make nuclear disarmament agreements. This ultimately signaled the end of the Cold War.
Document 3:
Gorbachev’s arms control policy should be seen against the background of these changes in doctrine, as well as changes in force posture to make forces more survivable by (1) putting more emphasis on bombers and cruise missiles, and (2) reducing reliance on large heavy missiles in favor of mobile missiles. Viewed in this light, Gorbachev’s willingness to sign the INF treaty makes eminent political and strategic sense. It eliminates an important nuclear threat to the U.S.S.R. posed by the cruise missiles and Pershing 2s, making Soviet territory once again a "sanctuary" from missiles launched from European soil. It also reduces NATO’s capability for nuclear escalation—the main Soviet concern should war in Europe break out—and erodes the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. Furthermore, Soviet advantages in conventional manpower and equipment, not to mention the geographic advantages for rapid conventional reinforcement, remain unaffected. While the U.S.S.R. must dismantle some 400 SS-20s and SS-5s, the targets covered by these weapons can be covered by other strategic systems, particularly the new SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are more accurate and mobile, and hence more survivable. Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons the Soviet military was willing to go along with the deal. At the same time, recent Soviet statements, including those by the military, have increasingly stressed the "defensive nature" of Soviet military doctrine. The main task of the Soviet armed forces is now said to be the "prevention of war." To accomplish this task the Soviet forces will be kept at a level of "reasonable sufficiency," which is defined as a level which "rules out superiority by the forces of imperialism."
4. What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to the military?
Gorbachev was able to successfully link his military reform to the restructuring of the economy. Additionally, he was able to improve relations with the United States the overall West. He was also essentially able to control military expenditures and political decisions regarding the military.
Moreover, he significantly escaped from arms racing, to dealing with the threatening international situations by political rather than by military means. Gorbachev essentially put forward a new way of thinking as the foundation for the new Soviet military policies.
Gorbachev’s reductions and restructuring degraded the ability of the Soviet military forces to concentrate combat power. Moreover, their offense largely decreased, and instead more focus was put towards their defense. Following Gorbachev’s resignation as President, the Soviet Union ultimately dissolved. Additionally, several Warsaw Pact nations and Soviet republics were inspired by glasnost and declared their intentions to free themselves from Communist rule. Specifically, large republics such as Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania had declared their independence.
Document 4:
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms followed two paths: perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost' (openness). In order to reform the Soviet economy, Gorbachev believed it was necessary to cut spending on the Soviet military, both inside Soviet borders and throughout Eastern Europe. By the end of 1989, 500,000 men had been decommissioned from the Soviet army, greatly reducing its military presence throughout Eastern Europe. In this intelligence assessment from 1990, the real impact of Soviet disarmament for the U.S. and its NATO allies is evaluated. Though some fears remain about Soviet military power, the Soviet unilateral disarmament had fundamentally degraded its military strength, which created new opportunities for the U.S. and NATO in planning for the future of Eastern Europe.
Works Cited:
Holloway, David. "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev." JSTOR. The MIT Press, 1989. Web. 1 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538930?seq=10>.
Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs. The
Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. Web. 26 Feb. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/43392/f-stephen-larrabee/gorbachev-and-the-soviet-military>.
"Mikhail Gorbachev." History. BBC, n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/mikhail_gorbachev>.
National Intelligence Council. "The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact Soviet
Union." Documents and Papers. Cold War International History Project, Apr. 1990. Web. 27 Feb. 2014. <http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/190>.